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DE FACTO PARENTS IN MARYLAND: WHEN WILL THE LAW 
RECOGNIZE THEIR RIGHTS? 
 
By: Michelle E. Kelly1 
 
I.     INTRODUCTION 
 
     Rachel and Allison were in a committed same-sex relationship beginning 
in 1990.  Although they never legally married, the couple decided to manifest 
their love by having a child in 2001.  Rachel and Allison both agreed that 
Rachel would carry the child by way of an anonymous sperm donor.  Their 
child, Kevin, was born on September 3, 2002.  Allison was present in the 
delivery room and even cut the umbilical cord.  From the time Kevin was 
born until the summer of 2009 when Rachel and Allison ended their 
relationship, the couple equally raised and cared for Kevin, sharing all major 
and minor decisions concerning him.  Kevin refers to Rachel as “mommy” 
and Allison as “mama.”  
     After nineteen years of their relationship, Allison moved out of their 
shared residence, leaving Kevin with Rachel.  Directly following their 
separation, Allison was able to visit with Kevin three days per week.  After 
only two months of this visitation agreement, Rachel refused Allison further 
contact with Kevin, prompting Allison to seek judicial relief.  However, the 
jurisdiction that both parties live in does not recognize the parent-child 
relationship that Allison has with Kevin.  Therefore, Allison cannot have 
contact or visitation with Kevin, without Rachel’s approval.   
     While the above narrative is fictional, it is analogous to many real 
accounts of de facto parents.2 The situation presented and the problems that 
derive from it are issues that many individuals in traditional relationships, as 
well as in same-sex relationships, have to deal with because of the lack of 
recognition of de facto parenthood.   
     As of 2008, an individual in Maryland who has raised, cared for, loved 
and otherwise acted as a parent for a non-biological, non-adopted child does 
not have custody or visitation rights with that child.  A person may not claim 
                                                                                                                               
1 J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of Baltimore School of Law.  I would like to 
thank Professor Barbara Babb for offering her insightful guidance and expertise 
throughout the drafting process.  I would also like to thank Jillian Walton and Nadya 
Cheatham for their overall commitment and contributions to later drafts of this 
Comment. 
2 See generally Janice M. v. Margaret K, 404 Md. 661, 948 A.2d 73 (2008); S.F. v. 
M.D., 132 Md. App. 99, 751 A.2d 9 (2000) (leading Maryland cases on de facto 
parenthood). 
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the status of de facto parent in Maryland.3  This limiting rule has a great 
impact on non-biological, non-adoptive parents in the state of Maryland. 
     Denying individuals who have acted, in all respects, as a child’s parent 
any rights to see or continue to raise the child can become a problem among 
non-married individuals, specifically in same-sex relationships.  This 
problem occurs when one parent is biologically related to the child with the 
help of either an egg or sperm donation and that parent’s partner is not 
biologically or legally related to the child, yet the partner has played a 
significant role in the child’s life.4  As a result of Maryland failing to 
recognize de facto parenthood, the courts have determined that an individual 
in that position, known as a third party, must show that the biological parent 
is either unfit or extraordinary circumstances exist, and then the court must 
move to the question of whether it is in the best interests of the child for the 
third party to receive custody or visitation.5  This standard means that a third 
party in a parental role has to abide by the same unfitness or extraordinary 
circumstances test as does any third party seeking custody or visitation.6 
     The American Law Institute has defined a de facto parent or “parent in 
fact” as,  
[A]n individual other than a legal parent or a parent by 
estoppel who, for a significant period of time not less than 
two years, (i) lived with the child and, (ii) for reasons 
primarily other than financial compensation, and with the 
agreement of a legal parent to form a parent-child 
relationship, or as a result of a complete failure or inability 
of any legal parent to perform caretaking functions, (A) 
regularly performed a majority of the caretaking functions 
for the child, or (B) regularly performed a share of 
caretaking functions at least as great as that of the parent 
with whom the child primarily lived.7 
 
                                                                                                                               
3 Janice M., 404 Md. 661, 948 A.2d 73.   
4 MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-3B-13(B)(2) (2006) (providing a solution to this 
problem which allows for an adoption to occur if the petitioner is married to the 
parent of the child in question and the parent has consented to the adoption.). 
5 McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 418-19, 869 A.2d 751, 808-09 (2005); See 
infra note 45; See also Janice M., 404 Md. at 693, 948 A.2d at 92.   
6 McDermott 385 Md. 374-75, 869 A.2d at 783 (“[G]enerally, in private actions in 
which private third parties are attempting to gain custody of children of natural 
parents over the objection of the natural parents, it is necessary first to prove that the 
parent is unfit or that there are extraordinary circumstances posing serious detriment 
to the child, before the court may apply a ‘best interest’ standard.”).  
7 Janice M., 404 Md. at 681, 948 A.2d at 85 (quoting American Law Institute, 
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 
2.03(1)(c), at 107-08 (2003)).  
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     This comment examines how other jurisdictions treat de facto parents, 
Maryland’s relevant case law and statutes, and advocates for why the 
Maryland legislature should recognize de facto parenthood or a parent-child 
relationship.  Section II of this article discusses the historical development of 
de facto parenthood and third party custody or visitation claims from the 
Supreme Court of the United States and how it is applied in other 
jurisdictions, while giving a background on de facto parent recognition in 
Maryland.  Section III explains Maryland’s decision not to recognize de facto 
parents in depth, while comparing that decision with other jurisdictions’ 
treatment of de facto parents.  Lastly, Section IV provides possible solutions 
through the Maryland legislature to individuals who are in a de facto parent 
relationship with a minor child.   
 
II.     THE BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF 
DE FACTO PARENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
     In Maryland, there is a rebuttable presumption that a child born into a 
marriage is presumed to be the child of that marriage.8  This presumption, 
known as the marital presumption, is the “common-law rule that a child born 
to a married woman, assuming her husband was neither impotent nor out of 
the country at the time of conception, is … presumed to be legitimate.”9  
Further, this marital presumption “also preserves family stability by 
‘excluding inquiries into the child's paternity that would be destructive of 
family integrity and privacy.’”10  While this marital presumption is 
historically significant, it is no longer as prominent as it once was in our 
nation’s history due to the increasing trend of decoupling in American 
culture.11   
     This notion of child legitimacy has become increasingly harder to follow 
in the wake of new advances in technology.  Prior to Assisted Reproductive 
Technology,12 it was much easier to establish the identity of the legal parents 
                                                                                                                               
8 MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1027 (West 1997). 
9 David M. Wagner, Balancing "Parents Are" and "Parents Do" in the Supreme 
Court's Constitutionalized Family Law: Some Implications for the Ali Proposals on 
De Facto Parenthood, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1175, n.32 (2001) (citing Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 117 (1989)). 
10 Id.  
11 “Today, more than 40% of all births in the United States are to unmarried women, 
compared to approximately 6% in 1960 and less than 20% in 1980.” JANE C. 
MURPHY & JANA SINGER, DIVORCED FROM REALITY: RETHINKING FAMILY DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION  61 (NYU Press 2015).    
12 “In general, ART procedures involve surgically removing eggs from a woman’s 
ovaries, combining them with sperm in the laboratory, and returning them to the 
woman’s body or donating them to another woman. They do NOT include 
treatments in which only sperm are handled…or procedures in which a woman takes 
medicine only to stimulate egg production without the intention of having eggs 
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of a child because there were only two parties involved.13  As a result of this 
new technology, up to five individuals can have a maternity or paternity 
claim to one child.14 
     This relatively recent phenomenon of third parties seeking visitation and 
custody of a child has resulted in all 50 states adopting some form of a non-
parent, or third party, visitation statute.15  Traditionally, the third parties who 
wanted visitation rights were the child’s grandparents.16  In recognizing the 
importance of grandparents being present in the lives of their grandchildren, 
the United States House of Representatives’ Select Committee of Aging and 
Subcommittee on Human Services held hearings on the issue, in which 
“House Concurrent Resolution Sixty-seven was adopted, which called for a 
uniform state act that would provide adequate rights to grandparents to 
petition for visitation with their grandchildren.”17   
     From the wave of grandparents seeking visitation rights with their 
grandchildren, came gay and lesbian de facto parents seeking visitation and 
custody with their non-biological, non-adopted child with their partner.18  As 
of 2009, it was estimated that three million adults that are members of the 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer (LGBTQ) community have 
a child and that upwards of six million adults and children in the United 




																																								 																																							 																																							 																						
retrieved.”  Assisted Reproductive Technology, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/art/whatis.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2015). 
13 Helene S. Shapo, Assisted Reproduction and the Law: Disharmony on a Divisive 
Social Issue, 100 NW. U.L. REV. 465, 465-66 (2006). See also Alan H. Boudreau, 
Professor, NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW, 2014 Spring CLE 
Conference of the American Bar Association Section of Family Law, Are You My 
Mommy?,  (May 8, 2014). 
14 Id.  
15 Holly M. Davis, Comment, Non-Parent Visitation Statutes: Was Troxel v. 
Granville Their Death-Knell?, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 721, 736 & n.152 (2002) 
(listing statutes from every state).  
16 Id. at 738 (citing Judith L. Shandling, The Constitutional Constraints on 
Grandparents' Visitation Statutes, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 118, 118 (1986)). See also Jon 
DeWitt Gregory, Whose Child is it, Anyway: The Demise of Family Autonomy and 
Parental Authority, 33 FAM. L.Q. 833, 834-35 (1999). 
17 Davis, supra note 15, at 739 (citing Ellen C. Segal & Naomi Karp, Grandparent 
Visitation Disputes: A Legal Resource Manual 1 (1989)).  
18 Id. 
19 Gary Gates, LBGT Parenting in the United States, The Williams Institute, UCLA 
SCHOOL OF LAW, 2 (2013), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-
content/uploads/LGBT-Parenting.pdf. 
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a.     The Third Party Custody and Visitation Standard from the Supreme 
Court of the United States 
 
     In 2000, the Supreme Court held a Washington visitation statute that 
stated “any person” could petition the court for visitation20 was 
unconstitutional because it infringed upon the fundamental rights of the fit 
parent to raise his or her children.21   In Troxel v. Granville, the paternal 
grandparents filed a petition against Tommie Granville, the biological 
mother, to obtain visitation rights, which the Washington Superior Court 
granted.22  The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the visitation order, 
and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the intermediate court’s 
decision.23  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed 
the judgment.24   
     The Court stated that a parent’s fundamental liberty interest is to be able 
to rear their children in whatever way the parent sees fit.25  In light of the 
presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interests of his or her child, 
the Washington Superior Court erred when it did not give Tommie 
Granville’s decision to restrict visitation with the paternal grandparents any 
special weight.26  Thus, a fit parent has discretion with how he or she chooses 
to raise his or her children, which limits the ability of third parties to seek 
visitation rights.27  While this case does not have a direct relationship to the 
rights of de facto parents, it is a significant case in the overall scheme of third 
party rights to custody or visitation of a minor child. 
 
b.     Extraordinary Circumstances Standard for Third Party Visitation 
 
     A non-biological third party seeking an interest in custody or visitation 
must show that the natural parent is unfit or that extraordinary circumstances 
exist, and that the custody or visitation is in the best interests of the child so 
the child may have a relationship with the third party.28  The court must first 
determine whether the natural parent is unfit or if exceptional 
                                                                                                                               
20 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000). 
21 Id.  
22 Id. at 61. 
23 Id. at 62-63.  
24 Id. at 64. 
25 Id. at 65.  
26 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 58 (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)).  
27 See generally Troxel, 530 U.S. 57 (holding that the Washington Grandparent 
Statute violated a parent’s fundamental liberty interest in how they raise and care for 
their children).      
28 McDermott, 385 Md. at 374, 869 A.2d at 782-83 (holding that the father’s 
occupation, which required him to be away from his son for months at a time, did not 
constitute exceptional circumstances for the grandparents to be awarded custody of 
the minor child.)  
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circumstances29 exist prior to the application of the best interests of the child 
test.30  This standard, taken from Troxel, requires that all third parties must 
meet in Maryland in order to have custody of or visitation with a minor child.  
 
c.     Recognition of De Facto Parent Status in Other Jurisdictions 
 
     Maryland would benefit greatly by adopting a de facto parent statute 
similar to those of other jurisdictions.  One de facto parent statute that 
Maryland should review is that of Washington, D.C.  The D.C. statute 
addresses the requirements for a de facto parent in two different but equally 
important ways.31  The first way an individual would be considered a de 
facto parent under the D.C. statute is whether that person has been present 
throughout the child’s entire life.32  The second way is if the individual has 
come into the child’s life at a later time but has still had a significant impact 
                                                                                                                               
29 Exceptional circumstances can be determined by “the length of time the child has 
been away from the biological parent, the age of the child when care was assumed by 
the third party, the possible emotional effect on the child of a change of custody, the 
period of time which elapsed before the parent sought to reclaim the child, the nature 
and strength of the ties between the child and the third party custodian, the intensity 
and genuineness of the parent's desire to have the child, the stability and certainty as 
to the child's future in the custody of the parent.” Janice M., 404 Md. at 677, 948 
A.2d at 82 (citing McDermott, 385 Md. at 419, 869 A.2d at 806 (quoting Ross v. 
Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 191 (1977))). 
30 Id.  
31 DC CODE § 16-831.01 (2009).  The Washington, D.C. legislature has defined a de 
facto parent as an individual:  
(A) Who:  
(i) Lived with the child in the same household at the time of the 
child’s birth or adoption by the child’s parent;  
(ii) Has taken on full and permanent responsibilities as the child’s 
parent; and  
(iii) Has held himself or herself out as the child’s parent with the 
agreement of the child’s parent or, if there are 2 parents, both 
parents; or  
(B) Who: 
 (i) Has lived with the child in the same household for at least 10 of the 12 
months immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or motion for 
custody;  
(ii) Has formed a strong emotional bond with the child with the 
encouragement and intent of the child’s parent that a parent-child 
relationship from between the child and third party; 
(iii) Has taken on full and permanent responsibilities as the child’s parent; 
and  
(iv) Has held himself or herself out as the child’s parent with the agreement 
of the child’s parent, or if there are 2 parents, both parents.  Id. 
32 Id. 
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on the child.33  Both definitions of a de facto parent take into consideration 
different ways of becoming a child’s de facto parent without holding one 
alternative as superior to the other.  Overall, there are thirty jurisdictions in 
the United States that have some recognition of de facto parents in custody or 
visitation matters.34 
 
d.     The Destruction of De Facto Parent Status in Maryland 
 
     Prior to Janice M. v. Margaret K. in 2008, Maryland recognized the 
importance of a de facto parent in a child’s life.  In 2000, the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland held that a de facto parent did not need to 
overcome the presumption in favor of the biological parent in showing 
parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances, but did need to show that 
visitation was in the best interest of the child.35   In S.F. v. M.D., a lesbian 
couple began their relationship in 1990.36  In 1994, the couple welcomed a 
child by artificial insemination.37   S.F. and M.D. jointly participated in 
raising their child until they ended their relationship in September of 1997, at 
which point M.D. moved out of their home, taking the child with her but 
agreeing to liberal visitation with S.F.38  After the child began exhibiting 
behavioral problems, M.D. cut off all visitation with S.F. and refused S.F. 
visits with the child.39  The Circuit Court for Montgomery County eventually 
held in March of 1999, after a pendente lite hearing that S.F. “served the 
fundamental role of a parent” to the child the first few years of the child’s 
life but found that visitation with S.F. was not in the best interest of the child 
due to the child’s behavioral issues.40  The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland affirmed this decision.41  Although the court did not award S.F. 
visitation to the child because of the child’s behavioral problems, the court 
did recognize the status of de facto parents and found that S.F. was the de 
facto parent to the child.42  This recognition of de facto parents in Maryland 
                                                                                                                               
33 Id.  
34 De Facto Parenting Statutes, FAMILY EQUAL. COUNCIL, 
http://www.familyequality.org/get_informed/equality_maps/de_facto_parenting_stat
utes/ (last updated Feb. 2, 2016); See, e.g., Minn. Stat. §257C.08, subd. 4 (“parent 
and child relationship”); Or. Rev. Stat. §109.119 (“parent-child relationship”); Mont. 
Code §40-4-211(4)(b)(6) (“parent-child relationship”); Nev. Rev. Stat. §125C.050(2) 
(“meaningful relationship”).  
35 S.F., 132 Md. App. 99 at 114, 751 A.2d 9 at 16-17.  
36 Id. at 102, 751 A.2d at 10.   
37 Id.  
38 Id. at 103, 751 A.2d at 11.  
39 Id. 
40 S.F., 132 Md. App. at 104-06, 751 A.2d at 16-17. 
41 Id. at 118, 751 A.2d at 19. 
42 Id. at 114, 751 A.2d at 16-17. 
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came to a halt in 2008, when the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided 
Janice M. v. Margaret K.43  
 
III.     JANICE M. V. MARGARET K.: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT THE 
PROBLEMS FACING DE FACTO PARENTS IN MARYLAND 
 
     In Janice M. v. Margaret K., the Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled that 
de facto parents are not recognized under the law.44  Therefore, every person 
who may be considered a de facto parent in another jurisdiction is only 
considered a third party in the state of Maryland.45  The court concluded that 
when there is a dispute between a fit parent and a third party, “both parties do 
not begin on equal footing in respect to care, custody, and control of the 
children”46 because of the parent’s fundamental right.47  Janice M. claimed 
that the circuit court erred in granting visitation to Margaret K. because the 
court found that she was a fit parent and that no extraordinary circumstances 
existed.48  Margaret K.’s argument rested on the fact that a person who is 
found to be a de facto parent by the courts thereby has satisfied the existence 
of exceptional circumstances, which is necessary to grant visitation or 
custody.49   
     Janice M. and Margaret K. began their relationship in 1986, and after 
thirteen years of being in a relationship, Janice M. legally adopted Maya 
from India.50  In their shared household, Janice M. and Margaret K. divided 
their childcare responsibilities until 2004, when Margaret K. moved out of 
the family home.51  Janice M. started putting limitations on Margaret K.’s 
visitation with Maya, which eventually led to Janice M. denying Margaret K. 
all visitation rights.52  After several years of litigation, Margaret K. 
ultimately lost all custody and visitation rights to Maya.53  
                                                                                                                               
43 See generally Janice M., 404 Md. 661, 948 A.2d 73. 
44 Id. at 695, 948 A.2d at 93. 
45 Id.  
46 Id. at 675, 948 A.2d at 81 (citing McDermott, 353 Md. at 743, 869 A.2d at 770.) 
47 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see also Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of 
the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), Troxel, 530 U.S. 57. 
48 Janice M., 404 Md. at 682, 948 A.2d at 85. 
49 Id.  
50 Id. at 665, 948 A.2d at 75.   
51 Id. at 666, 948 A.2d at 76.   
52 Id. 
53 Id.  The Circuit Court for Baltimore County ruled that Margaret was a de facto 
parent to Maya and was entitled to visitation.  The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s decision.  The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
reversed the intermediate court’s decision, saying that de facto parent status is not 
recognized in the state; therefore, Margaret is not entitled to custody or visitation of 
Maya, unless she was successful in proving that Janice M. was unfit or that 
extraordinary circumstances existed.  See Janice M., 404 Md. at 666, 948 A.2d at 76. 
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     In 2005, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County awarded Margaret K., the 
non-biological, non-adoptive parent of Maya, visitation with Maya because 
she was viewed, in all regards, as Maya’s parent, acting as her de facto 
parent.54  The court found that Margaret K.’s visitation was in Maya’s best 
interests.55  The circuit court relied on S.F. v. M.D.,56 in which there were 
four factors to prove that Margaret K. was a de facto parent to Maya.57  The 
factors require that the “legal parent must consent to and foster the 
relationship between the third party and the child; the third party must have 
lived with the child; the third party must perform parental functions for the 
child to a significant degree; and most importantly, a parent-child bond must 
be forged.”58  After establishing that all four factors were met, the court 
stated that it would be “detrimental [to Maya] that [visitation] be cut off 
totally.”59  On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the 
circuit court’s decision to grant Margaret K. visitation.60   
     Janice M. appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, 
which held that Margaret K. is not a de facto parent; therefore, she is not 
entitled to custody or visitation.61  The court went further to expressly deny 
de facto parental rights in Maryland.62   The court of appeals addressed the 
fact that a visitation claim is a “species of custody”63 and therefore receives 
the same deference as does a petition for custody.64   
     The essence of the court’s decision rested on the notion that there is a 
presumption in the law that a parent will act in the best interest of his or her 
child, so the third party seeking visitation or custody has the burden of 
showing exceptional circumstances for that individual to have a claim.65  The 
assessment of whether exceptional circumstances exists relies upon a number 
of factors that the court may consider, such as the child’s age when the third 
party began caring for the child, or the psychological bond that the child may 
have with the third party.66  The court noted, however, that before a trial 
court can assess the best interest of the child question, it must first find that 
                                                                                                                               
54 Id. at 669, 948 A.2d at 77. 
55 Id.  
56 S.F., 132 Md. App. at 111. 
57 Janice M. v. Margaret K., 171 Md. App. 528, 536-37, 910 A.2d 1145, 1150-51 
(2006), rev’d, 404 Md. 661, 948 A.2d 73 (2008) (citing S.F., 132 Md. App. at 111).  
58 Id. at 537. 
59 Janice M., 404 Md. at 669, 948 A.2d at 77. 
60 Id.  
61 See generally Janice M., 404 Md. 661, 948 A.2d 73; see infra Section III.  
62 Janice M., 404 Md. at 685. 
63 Id. at 678, 948 A.2d at 83 (citing Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 429, 921 A.2d 
171, 185 (2007)). 
64 Id.  
65 McDermott, 385 Md. at 424-25, 869 A.2d at 812-13; See also Troxel, 530 U.S. 57.  
66 See S.F., 132 Md. App. at 102, 751 A.2d at 10.  
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the legal parent is unfit or that extraordinary circumstances exist.67  Thus, 
Margaret K.’s active involvement in Maya’s life from the time Maya came to 
the United States in 1999 until 2004, when Janice M. and Margaret K. 
separated, had no bearing on the Court of Appeals of Maryland.68   
 
a.     The Dissenting Opinion to Janice M. v. Margaret K. 
 
     In the dissent, Judge Raker stated that a de facto parent should be viewed 
differently than a third party.69  Judge Raker would recognize the rights of de 
facto parents as they should stand in “legal parity with a legal parent, 
whether biological, adoptive, or otherwise,” and would hold that an 
individual, who has established that he or she is a de facto parent, would not 
be required to show that the natural parent is unfit or extraordinary 
circumstances exist, but only that the visitation would be in the best interests 
of the child.70  She argued that the best interests of the child standard should 
control the custody or visitation determination.71  Judge Raker noted that a de 
facto parent statute can be applied too broadly by asserting that an individual 
who has satisfied the requirements of a de facto parent has already jumped 
the hurdle and “overcome the presumption in favor of a natural parent’s 
rights” proving that he or she is a parent to the child.72   
 
b.     Margaret K. Did Not Legally Adopt Maya  
 
     Janice M. was the only legally adoptive parent of Maya, while Margaret 
K. was fulfilling the role of Maya’s other parent.73  A criticism to Janice M., 
and largely to the notion that the two parties could have avoided this lawsuit, 
is that Margaret K. could have legally adopted Maya as the second parent 
along with Janice M.74  It is true that Margaret K. and Janice M. could have 
gone through with the second adoption, but they chose not to because they 
had plans to continue growing their family, and the adoption agency advised 
them that they would likely not be able to adopt another child from a foreign 
                                                                                                                               
67 Janice M., 404 Md. at 676, 948 A.2d at 773.  
68See generally Janice M., 404 Md. 661, 948 A.2d 73. 
69 Id. at 696, 948 A.2d at 94.    
70 Id. at 709, 948 A.2d at 83.  
71 Id. at 696-97, 948 A.2d at 94. 
72 Id. at 704, 948 A.2d at 98.  
73 Id. at 666, 948 A.2d at 79. 
74 Family Law - De Facto Parent Bill: Hearing on SB402 and HB0577 Before the 
Senate and House Comm. 2015 Leg. Regular Session (2015) (question by Senator 
Norman: 2:16:36) http://mgahouse.maryland.gov/mga/play/cf7d05ef17a84b8a 
98386dc72587c709/?catalog/ 03e481c7-8a42-4438- a7da 93ff74bdaa4c& 
playfrom=7863750. 
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country if they went through with a second adoption.75  Therefore, Margaret 
K. and Janice M. made the decision to have Janice M. as the sole legal 
adoptive parent of Maya with the understanding that they would continue to 
grow their family through more foreign adoptions.76 
 
c.     Maryland Law in Comparison to Other Jurisdictions that Recognize 
De Facto Parents 
 
     While Maryland has not recognized de facto parenthood since 2008, other 
jurisdictions have become increasingly more accepting of de facto parents.77  
With thirty jurisdictions recognizing de facto parents or allowing a limited 
recognition of de facto parents,78 Maryland has the opportunity to scrutinize 
these jurisdictions’ statutes in order to craft a working statute for Maryland.  
The jurisdictions that do recognize de facto parenthood are not limited to one 
specific region, as they stretch from Maine to New Mexico to Washington.79 
     In C.E.W. v. D.E.W., the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine determined 
that a de facto parent should be awarded parental rights and responsibilities 
to the child in question and that it is in the best interests of the child for the 
de facto parent to have those rights.80  In this case, C.E.W. and D.E.W. were 
lesbian partners who parented a child equally; however, D.E.W. was the 
biological mother.81  After the child’s birth, C.E.W. and D.E.W established a 
parenting agreement, in which each party was to have equal parental roles 
and rights to their child.82  Additionally, D.E.W. conceded that C.E.W. was 
the child’s de facto parent.83   
                                                                                                                               
75 Id. According to Jer Welter, Deputy Director and Managing Attorney of FreeState 
Legal, which is Maryland’s provider of direct pro-bono legal services for the low-
income lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community, there are two main 
reasons for why one party, specifically the de facto parent, does not adopt.  The two 
reasons are that adoption is not something an individual thinks about when times are 
happy with the legally adoptive parent and child, and that “adoption is difficult and 
expensive in this state.”  Id. at 2:43:30.   
76 Brief for Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 4, Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 
948 A.2d 73 (2008) (No. 122).  
77 See, e.g., 2015 Maine Laws, LD 1017, subch. 5 (127th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 2015) 
(eff. July 1, 2016); In re Guardianship of Victoria R., 145 N.M. 500 (2008) n. 6 
(recognizing that Petitioners would be considered psychological parents); In re 
Parentage of L.B., 155 Wn.2d 679 (2005) (adopting the four-part test in determining 
de facto parentage). 
78See supra note 33.  
79 See supra note 77. 
80 C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146 (2004).  
81 Id. at 1147.  
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
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     In its opinion, the court stated that, “the child, now age nine, has bonded 
with C.E.W. as his parent.”84  This statement shows that this court took the 
child’s age into consideration when determining if C.E.W. was a de facto 
parent.  While the court did not confront the question of the standard for 
determining de facto parenthood, it did state that this determination “must 
surely be limited to those adults who have fully and completely undertaken a 
permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in the 
child's life.”85  The facts of C.E.W. v. D.E.W are analogous to the facts of 
Janice M. v. Margaret K., with the only disparity being different 
jurisdictions. 
     Another case with facts similar to Janice M. is In re Parentage of L.B.,86 
which established de facto parentage in the state of Washington.87  In this 
case, a lesbian couple parented a minor child, L.B., to whom one of the 
women is biologically related through artificial insemination.88  The couple 
equally cared for L.B. and maintained one residence for the first six years of 
L.B.’s life.89  After the couple’s separation, the biological mother terminated 
contact between her former partner and L.B.90   
     As a result of the biological parent terminating contact with the non-
biological parent, the non-biological parent sought to be declared as a de 
facto parent and argued that she was entitled to visitation.91  Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court of Washington held that the claim of de facto parentage 
existed.92  The court adopted a four-part test to determine if an individual is 
entitled to be recognized as a de facto parent.93  
     In the instant case, the child in question, Maya, resided with Margaret K. 
for the first four and one-half years of her life.94  During the four and one-
half years, Janice M. and Margaret K. shared the responsibilities of caring for 
Maya, such as “preparing Maya’s food, changing her diapers, bathing her, 
                                                                                                                               
84 Id.  
85 Id. at 1152. 
86 In re Parentage of L.B., 155 Wn.2d 679 (2005). 
87 Id.  The terms “parentage” and “parenthood” can be used interchangeably. 
88 Id. at 683-84.   
89 Id. at 684. 
90 Id at 684-85. 
91 Id. at 685.  
92 In re Parentage of L.B., 155 Wn.2d at 707. 
93 The four-part test to determine de facto parentage is: (1) whether the natural or 
legal parent consented to and fostered the parent-like relationship, (2) whether the 
petitioner and the child lived together in the same household, (3) whether the 
petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood without expectation of financial 
compensation, and (4) whether the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length 
of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent 
relationship, parental in nature. Id. at 708. 
94 Janice M., 404 Md. at 666, 948 A.2d at 76.   
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handling her schooling, addressing her healthcare needs, and performing 
most other caretaking duties.”95  The facts of Janice M. are very similar to 
those of C.E.W. v. D.E.W. and In re Parentage of L.B..  Nonetheless, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland, unlike courts in Maine and Washington, did 
not hold these facts to be persuasive in the establishment of de facto 
parenthood.96 
     Additionally, Holtzman v. Knott (In re H.S.H.-K.) set forth a four-part test 
for how to determine if a de facto parent-child relationship exists.97  This 
case demonstrates how difficult it is for an individual to be found a de facto 
parent by the courts.  The facts in this case are similar to those of the 
previous two cases in which lesbian partners maintained a household and 
provided equal care to their child, to whom only one of the women was 
biologically related.98   
     The court in In re H.S.H.-K. held that the petitioner’s custody claim to the 
child could not be supported because she failed to raise a triable issue to 
which a custody award could be granted.99  The court stated that a circuit 
court could determine if she was entitled to visitation if it was in the best 
interests of the child and if each factor in the four-part test had been 
satisfied.100  Thus, this outcome demonstrates the burden that one must 
overcome to prove that a parent-child relationship exists in order to be 
granted custody or visitation, furthering Judge Raker’s dissent in Janice M. v. 
Margaret K that a statute can be narrowly tailored to only benefit a true de 




                                                                                                                               
95 Id.  
96 See generally Janice M., 404 Md. 661, 948 A.2d 73. 
97 Holtzman v. Knott (In re H.S.H.-K.), 193 Wis. 2d 649 (1995).  The four part test 
requires “(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the 
petitioner's formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child; 
(2) that the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household; (3) that the 
petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for 
the child's care, education and development, including contributing towards the 
child's support, without expectation of financial compensation; and (4) that the 
petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have 
established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature.”  Id. at 
658-59.   
98 Id. at 660-61.  
99See generally In re H.S.H.-K, 193 Wis. 2d 649 (holding, in part, that the circuit 
court’s conclusion that a triable issue was not raised regarding the biological parent’s 
fitness or compelling circumstances that would justify a hearing on custody). 
100 Id. at 699.   
101 Supra notes 69-72. 
 
2016] De Facto Parents in Maryland  
 
129 
d.     Justifications of a De Facto Parent Statute  
 
     The justification for having a de facto parent statute in Maryland is that it 
would allow for individuals who are not related biologically or by adoption 
but who have acted in a parental role with the child to have visitation and 
custody rights to that child.102  Also, a de facto parent statute would protect 
the child’s interest in maintaining a relationship with a person with whom he 
or she has a strong parental bond, despite there being no biological or 
adoptive relationship.103  A de facto parent has a much stronger claim to 
custody or visitation because that person is not merely a third-party, like a 
grandparent.104  De facto parents are treated as a parent – as a person who has 
cared for the child in a parental capacity.105  Parental capacity can be defined 
as meeting the child’s health, developmental, and emotional needs, providing 
consistent care and putting the child’s needs first.106  Further, only those 
individuals who “developed parent-child relationships with the consent and 
support of the children’s legal parents could have become de facto 
parents.”107  
     Additionally, as Justice Kennedy stated in his dissent in Troxel, “a fit 
parent’s right vis-à-vis a complete stranger is one thing; his or her right vis-à-
vis another parent or a de facto parent may be another.”108  Justice Kennedy 
acknowledged that the traditional nuclear family is no longer the norm, 
especially now that the Supreme Court has decided that same-sex marriage is 
legal.109  The change in the traditional family prompted Justice Kennedy to 
point out that many cases will arise where a third party, who has acted in a 
parental capacity for a “significant time” and has developed a relationship 
with a child, is not subject to “absolute parental veto.”110  Justice Kennedy 
stated that the best interests of the child standard should be applied in 
                                                                                                                               
102 Rachel Simmonsen, Legislating After Janice M.: The Constitutionality of 
Recognizing De Facto Parenthood in Maryland, 70 MD. L. REV. 525, 526-28 (2011). 
103 Id. at 554.   
104 Id. at 560 n. 300 (citing Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. at 441-42, 921 A.2d at 192-
93 (2007) (In Maryland, a grandparent must satisfy the same standard as a third party 
would for custody or visitation of their grandchild.)).   
105 See supra note 74. 
106 Assessing Parenting Capacity: A NSPCC Factsheet, 2014 NSPCC, 
https://www.nspcc.org.uk/globalassets/documents/information-service/factsheet-
assessing-parenting-capacity.pdf.  
107 Simmonsen, supra note 100, at 554 (citation omitted).  
108 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 100-01 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
109 Id. at 98.   
110 Id.  An “absolute parental veto” refers to the biological parent’s ability to prohibit 
third parties from forming or maintaining a relationship with the child(ren) in 
question. 
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situations like these, because cutting off a child’s substantial relationship 
with a de facto parent could harm that child, as well as the de facto parent.111 
 
e.     Criticisms of a De Facto Parent Statute 
 
     The major criticism for establishing a de facto parent statute is that such a 
statute would allow for any party to make a de facto parent claim.112  The 
argument is that a de facto parent statute would increase the number of 
classes of adults who would “claim a status equivalent to [that] accorded to 
legal parents.”113  In addition, the criticism laid out against same-sex couples 
that raise a child together could be applied to a step-parent, boyfriend or 
girlfriend, or ex-spouse of the child’s parent.114  This argument stems from 
the fact that there is both a high divorce rate and a high cohabitation rate in 
the United States, which could increase the numbers of persons who might 
seek parental rights when they otherwise would not be entitled to those 
rights.115   
     Another criticism of a de facto parent statute is that only one biological or 
adoptive parent has to allow another person, wholly unrelated to the child, to 
establish a de facto parent relationship with that child.116  This can result in 
the other biological or adoptive parent being completely unaware of this de 
facto relationship that has been fostered by the other biological parent.117  
This argument, specifically in reference to the American Law Institute’s 
definition of de facto parent,118 stands to say, “the ALI proposal requires the 
consent of only one natural parent, and the consent is not to the de facto 
relationship itself. Rather, the consent is only to the precursor facts that the 
would-be de facto parent may later use in their petition for that status from a 
court.”119  This could mean, for example, that a legal parent would not only 
have to share custody or visitation with the ex-partner or spouse, but he or 
she would also have to share custody with that ex-partner’s or ex-spouse’s 
current partner.120   
     Although these criticisms are valid, it is possible for the legislature to 
avoid such dilemmas by drafting a narrower de facto parent statute, allowing 
                                                                                                                               
111 Id. at 99.  
112 William C. Duncan, The Legal Fiction of De Facto Parenthood, 36 J. LEGIS. 263, 
266 (2010). 
113 Id.  
114 Id. 
115 Id.  
116 Id. at 265. 
117 Duncan, supra note 110, at 265.  
118 See supra note 7.  
119 David Wagner, Balancing “Parents Are” and “Parents Do” in the Supreme 
Court’s Constitutionalized Family Law: Some Implications for the ALI Proposals on 
De Facto Parenthood, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1175, 1185-86 (2001). 
120 Duncan, supra note 110, at 265.  
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only those individuals who have truly been in a de facto parent relationship 
to have a custody or visitation claim in court. 
 
IV.     TIMELY SOLUTIONS TO THE LACK OF RECOGNITION  
OF DE FACTO PARENTS 
 
During the 2015 Regular Session of the Maryland General Assembly 
the “Family Law – De Facto Parent” Bill was proposed in the Senate by 
Senator Madaleno and cross-filed in the House.121   The Bill received an 
unfavorable report by the judiciary and was subsequently withdrawn by the 
Bill’s sponsors.122 
                                                                                                                               
121 Family Law – De Facto Parent, S.R. 402, MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
(2015), http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2015RS/bills/sb/sb0402f.pdf; House Bill 0577, 
Family Law – De Facto Parent, H.R. 0577, 2015 Sess. (M.D. 2015), 
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2015RS/bills/hb/hb0577f.pdf.  The bill was introduced 
on February 6, 2015 and first read on February 12, 2015.  Id.  The House Bill was 
sponsored by Delegate Valentino-Smith.  Id.  
122 The Bill stated: “(A) In this section, “de facto parent” means an individual, 
including a current or former spouse of a parent of a child, who: (1) Over a 
substantial period of time has: (I) Been treated as a parent by the child; (II) Formed a 
meaningful parental relationship with the child; and (III) Lived with the child; 
(2) Has undertaken full and permanent responsibilities as a parent of the child; and 
(3) Has held the individual out as a parent of the child with the agreement of a parent 
of the child, which may be expressed or implied from the circumstances and conduct 
of the parties.  (B) (1) In a judicial proceeding in which the parentage of a child is at 
issue, including a judicial proceeding concerning child custody, visitation, or 
support, the court may determine whether an individual is a de facto parent of the 
child on request of the individual, the child, or a parent of the child.  (2) An 
individual who asserts that the individual is a de facto parent of a child may initiate 
or intervene in a judicial proceeding in which the parentage of the child is at issue by 
filing a verified pleading alleging prima facie evidence that the individual is a de 
facto parent of the child.  (3) In a judicial proceeding in which the parentage of a 
child is at issue and a request has been made for a determination of whether an 
individual is a de facto parent of the child, the court shall determine in a written 
finding on the record whether the individual is a de facto parent of the child: (I) On 
the basis of a preponderance of the evidence; (II) With the burden of proof placed on 
the party asserting that the individual is a de facto parent of the child; and (III) At the 
earliest practicable opportunity in the proceeding.  (C) (1) An individual who is 
judicially determined to be a de facto parent of a child under this section shall have 
all the duties, rights, and obligations of a parent of the child, including the duties, 
rights, and obligations described in § 5–203(B) of this subtitle, unless the court 
determines by clear and convincing evidence that a continuing parent-child 
relationship between the de facto parent and the child is not in the best interest of the 
child. (2) In a judicial proceeding in which a parent of a child and an individual who 
has been judicially determined to be a de facto parent of the child dispute the 
allocation of child custody and visitation, the court shall resolve the dispute on the 
basis of the best interest of the child.” 
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     Although the Bill did not go forward in the 2015 General Assembly 
Session, there is another solution to provide de facto parents and third parties 
with rights by enacting a statute that defines a “parent-child relationship.”  
The Commission on Child Custody Decision-Making’s final report submitted 
to the Governor and General Assembly provides such a definition.  The 
December, 2014 final report defines a parent-child relationship as a 
relationship that:  
1) exists or did exist preceding the filing of an action 
under this section, in which a person provides or 
provided for the physical needs of a child by supplying 
food, shelter, and clothing and provides or provided the 
child with necessary care, education, and discipline; 2) 
continues or existed on a day-to-day basis through 
interaction, companionship, and mutuality that fulfill 
the child’s psychological need for a parent as well as 
the child’s physical needs; and 3) meets or met the 
child’s need for continuity of care by providing 
permanency or stability in residence, schooling, and 
activities outside of the home.123 
 
This Final Report has the potential to provide de facto parents in Maryland 
with the opportunity to establish the existence of a parent-child relationship 
in a court setting.  While this definition is not law, it permits de facto parents 
to argue that a parent-child relationship exists and receive recognition as the 
child’s parent. 
     Colorado and several other jurisdictions have parent-child relationship 
statutes.124  Colorado has several statutes that recognize a parent-child 
                                                                                                                               
123  DEP’T OF FAMILY ADMIN., COMM’N ON CHILD CUSTODY DECISION-MAKING 17 
(2014), available at http://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc5300/sc5339/ 
000113/020000/020737/unrestricted/20150076e.pdf. 
124 Another jurisdiction that has a parent-child relationship statute is Oregon.  
Oregon’s statute defines a “child-parent relationship” as: “(a) “Child-parent 
relationship” means a relationship that exists or did exist, in whole or in part, within 
the six months preceding the filing of an action under this section, and in which 
relationship a person having physical custody of a child or residing in the same 
household as the child supplied, or otherwise made available to the child, food, 
clothing, shelter and incidental necessaries and provided the child with necessary 
care, education and discipline, and which relationship continued on a day-to-day 
basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay and mutuality, that fulfilled the 
child's psychological needs for a parent as well as the child's physical needs. 
However, a relationship between a child and a person who is the nonrelated foster 
parent of the child is not a child-parent relationship under this section unless the 
relationship continued over a period exceeding 12 months.”  OR. REV. STAT. § 
109.119(10)(a).  
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relationship, both traditional and non-traditional, however, the state’s most 
significant statute that provides guidelines for satisfying the de facto parent 
status appears in the Probate, Trusts, and Fiduciaries Title.125  The Colorado 
statute has similar language to the final report in its definition of the role that 
an individual has played in a child’s life.  Many other states have recognized 
a parent-child relationship through their legislature or case law that allows 
for a non-biological, non-adoptive parent to have a legally established 
relationship with a child.   
 
V.     CONCLUSION 
 
     The Janice M. v. Margaret K. decision had a chilling effect because it 
affirmatively denied parents legal recognition of their parent-child 
relationship.  For the time being, individuals in same-sex relationships must 
proceed with the second legal adoption to ensure that the non-biological, 
non-adoptive parent has a legally recognized parent-child relationship.  
Although the Janice M. v. Margaret K. decision has negatively affected the 
lives of many de facto parents in Maryland, it might not remain the standard 
for long.  The Obergefell v. Hodges decision, recognizing same-sex couples’ 
constitutional right to marry, may encourage states to adopt de facto parent 
statutes.126  And more significantly the Court of Appeals of Maryland has 
been presented with a second opportunity to decide this issue in Conover v. 
Conover.127  In Conover, the court was asked to reconsider their Janice M. 
decision.128     
                                                                                                                               
125 “[A] parent-child relationship exists between a child of assisted reproduction and 
an individual other than the birth mother who consented to assisted reproduction by 
the birth mother with intent to be treated as the other parent of the child. Consent to 
assisted reproduction by the birth mother with intent to be treated as the other parent 
of the child is established if the individual:  
(a) Before or after the child's birth, signed a record that, considering all the facts and 
circumstances, evidences the individual's consent; or (b) In the absence of a signed 
record under paragraph (a) of this subsection (6): (i) Functioned as a parent of the 
child no later than two years after the child's birth; (ii)Intended to function as a 
parent of the child no later than two years after the child's birth but was prevented 
from carrying out that intent by death, incapacity, or other circumstances; or (iii) 
Intended to be treated as a parent of a posthumously conceived child, if that intent is 
established by clear and convincing evidence.” COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-120 
(West 2010). 
126 See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to marry two people of the same sex and all 
states must recognize a marriage between a same-sex couple that was lawfully 
licensed in another state).  
127 Conover v. Conover, 224 Md. App. 366, 128 A.3d 51 (2015).  Michelle Conover 
and Brittany Conover started dating in 2002 and, together, decided to have a child 
through artificial insemination of Brittany.  The child, Jaxon, was born on April 4, 
2010.  In September, 2010, Michelle and Brittany married in D.C. because, at the 
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     More than half of the jurisdictions in the U.S. recognize that individuals 
who take on a parental role deserve legal protection of their parent-child 
relationship.  They should be entitled to seek custody or visitation so long as 
it is in the best interests of the child.  The traditional nuclear family is no 
longer the norm in today’s society.  Thus, individuals, who have satisfied the 
criteria of a de facto parent, should be recognized under the law.  Maryland 
should follow this trend whether it is through an act of the judiciary or the 
legislature.     
																																								 																																							 																																							 																						
time, Maryland did not recognize same-sex marriages.  One year later, Michelle and 
Brittany separated, but Michelle continued to visit with Jaxon until Brittany 
prevented her from seeing Jaxon in July, 2012.  Michelle argues that she has met the 
paternity factors for a “father” under E.T. § 1-208(b)(4) and that she should be 
recognized as a de facto parent to Jaxon.  The Court of Appeals of Maryland heard 
oral arguments on April 5, 2016.   
128 Conover, 445 Md. 487, 128 A.3d 51 (2015).  
 
